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SOME HYPOTHESES ABOUT EMPIRICAL
DESERT
Christopher Slobogin*
Elsewhere in this issue, Paul Robinson lays out his argument for basing
criminal law doctrine on "empirical desert." 1 His central contention is that
adherence to societal views of "justice"-defined in terms of moral
blameworthiness-will not only satisfy retributive urges but will also often
be as efficacious at controlling crime as a system that revolves around other
utilitarian purposes of punishment. Constructing criminal laws that
implement empirical desert has the latter effect, Robinson argues, because it
enhances the moral credibility of the law, thus minimizing citizens' desire
to engage in vigilantism and other forms of non-compliance and increasing
their willingness to accept controversial government decisions to
criminalize or de-criminalize. Compared to general deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation, Robinson states, recognition of empirical
desert as the organizing principle of criminal justice will usually pay
superior long-term, crime-reducing dividends.
Robinson's short treatment of this idea in the pages of this journal
summarizes a huge amount of his earlier, highly innovative work spelling it
out in detail. Like Robinson, I will resist canvassing all of this work here.
Instead, in keeping with the utilitarian spirit of Robinson's agenda, the main
goal of this paper is to propose hypotheses that test possible vulnerabilities
of his argument. Robinson's work on empirical desert is provocative, but
could use further empirical support.
I.

CAN VIEWS ON DESERT BE ASCERTAINED EMPIRICALLY?

The starting predicate for Robinson's argument is that societal views
about desert can be measured accurately and that many of those views are
widely shared. Robinson concludes, based on his own and others' empirical
work, that "there appears to be an enormous amount of agreement about
intuitions of justice across all demographics, at least with regard to the core
of wrongdoing-physical aggression, taking property without consent, and

Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as
1.
Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1104-07 (2011).
*
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deceit in exchanges." 2 More specifically, people not only rank order the key
general offenses-murder, rape, robbery-the same, but rank order fairly
nuanced scenarios within those offenses in identical fashion. For instance,
Robinson and Rob Kurzban report a very high degree of consistency among
over 300 demographically-diverse participants in ordering twenty-four
relatively detailed scenarios, seven having to do with homicide, six with
serious assault, seven with theft, and four with various types of defenses. 3
The questions still nag: How robust are these findings? Will rankings of
the core crimes hold up across populations and on different sets of facts?
What is the role of empirical desert outside the core?
Hypothesis 1: Rank orderings of core crimes will vary not only with
perceived desert, but also with the perceived dangerousness(treatability)of
the defendant, the perceived need to deter the particularcrime, and other
factors unrelated to desert. For instance, in one scenario in Robinson and
Kurzban's study the defendant is offended by a woman's mocking remark
and decides to stab her with a letter opener from his desk, causing her death
(Scenario 1). In another scenario, almost uniformly ranked by study
participants as meriting more punishment than Scenario 1, the defendant is
highly offended by a woman, waits at her apartment for her to return from
work and, when she appears, shoots her to death (Scenario 2).' One
wonders whether the same rank ordering would occur if these scenarios
were modified to include additional information about the offenders.
Assume, for instance, that the offender in Scenario 1 is said to have enjoyed
killing the woman and wants to kill others who have offended him, while
the defendant in Scenario 2 is said to be remorseful and willing to undergo
therapy. Would the ordinal ranking of these two scenarios switch in light of
this additional information about risk?
In a study conducted with John Darley, Robinson purports to find that in
making these sorts of punishment rankings subjects rely solely on desert,
untainted by perceptions of offender dangerousness. 5 But that study defined
dangerousness solely in terms of criminal history and asked how "severe"
the "punishment" should be, language that sounds in desert rather than in
risk6 (the latter a concern that might be better plumbed with a query about
the "disposition" the offender should receive). If research finds that
2.
Id. at 1106.
3.
Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of
Justice, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1829, 1876-80 (2007) (reporting two studies).
4.
Id. at 1897.
5.
John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith & Paul H. Robinson, Incapacitation and Just
Deserts as Motivesfor Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 659 (2000).
6.
Id. at 663. The authors also note that the study's within-subject design "could have
created a demand to react to [the] cases with different sentence assignments." Id. at 676-77.
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perceived dangerousness or treatability, or the perceived need to deter
certain crimes, influences ordinal determinations, then criminal laws based
solely on empirical desert may depart from societal views on punishment.
One reason to think such findings might be forthcoming is the fairly
consistent research conclusion that, when asked in the abstract about the
primary goal of criminal justice, protection of the public is often listed
first.7
Empirical desert could also vary due to factors that are not considered
legitimate punishment goals. For instance, if the defendant in Scenario 1 is
described as African-American and the defendant in Scenario 2 is described
as white, would the rank ordering change? If the victim in the first scenario
remains a woman, but the victim in the second scenario is described as a
man, would the rank ordering change? One would hope the answer to both
questions would be no, and that might well be the finding. But if results
vary based on demographic modifications like these, or on any other
modification that might trigger idiosyncratic emotional or unconscious
reactions, can empirical desert provide consistent enough results to inform
policymakers?
Hypothesis 2: There will be significant disagreement about the precise
punishment for core crimes. For instance, people may agree that the
defendant in Scenario 2 deserves harsher punishment than the defendant in
Scenario 1, but disagree vehemently about the precise amount of
punishment each should receive. This hypothesis has already been borne out
in several studies, including some conducted by Robinson and Darley. Their
initial path-breaking research, providing participants with a number of
scenarios in eighteen different criminal law domains, indicates that in at
least 20% of the cases people's views vary widely when assigning the
BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, OPTIMISM, PESSIMISM, AND JAILHOUSE
7.
REDEMPTION: AMERICAN ATTITUDES ON CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND OVER-INCARCERATION 3

(2001), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/overincarcerationsurvey.pdf (indicating
that the main purpose of prison should be "to rehabilitate" (40%), "to punish" (21%), and "to
protect society" (21%)); VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JUDITH GREENE, JUST. POL'Y INST., CUTTING
CORRECTLY: NEW PRISON POLICIES FOR TIMES OF FISCAL CRISIS 5-8 (2002), available at

http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/02-02_REPCuttingCorrectly.AC.pdf (poll finding
that rehabilitation should be the primary goal of criminal justice); Francis T. Cullen et al.,
Public Opinion about Punishment and Corrections,27 CRIME & JUST. 1, 34 (2000) (finding that
while "offense seriousness . . . explained the largest amount of variation in sentencing
preferences," when asked to describe the purpose of the sentence assigned, "the goal of just
deserts ranked fourth behind special deterrence, boundary setting, and rehabilitation as a 'very
important' reason for choosing the sentence"); Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Criminal
Record, and the Sentencing Process, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 488, 494 (1996) (finding that with
respect to mild and moderate crimes, people are willing to abandon the retributive principle that
punishment should be proportional to the gravity of the crime).
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degree of punishment. 8 Of course, as Robinson points out, "once a society
commits itself to a punishment continuum endpoint, as every society must
do (whether it is the death penalty or life imprisonment or 20 years), the
large number of cases of distinguishable blameworthiness must be fit on
this limited punishment continuum." 9 But for people who are repulsed by
the death penalty (or, at the other end of the spectrum, by a maximum
twenty-year sentence for murder), a contrary punishment continuum is not
likely to correspond with their sense of desert, leaving policy makers who
want to adhere to empirical desert in a quandary.
Hypothesis 3. Both the rank orderings and the punishment for crimes
that are outside the core crimes will vary significantly. Robinson does not
contest this hypothesis, and indeed provides data to back it up.'" Many
crimes on the books, ranging from pollution laws, insider trading, and tax
fraud to drug and gun possession, various forms of sexual intercourse, and
third-trimester abortion, are probably outside the "core." Disagreement as to
the relative blameworthiness of these crimes and similar crimes may well be
very high. For instance, a majority of African-Americans and Latinos might
support the passage of hate crimes, a majority of whites may not. A
majority of men might prefer subjective liability for rape, while a majority
of women might want strict liability for that crime." A majority of
suburbanites may want tough sentences for drug dealing, a majority of
inner-city dwellers may not.
In these situations, Robinson suggests, empirical desert's role is to advise
policymakers to cast whatever decision they make in terms of the values
manifested by the core crimes. Thus, for instance, he and Darley argue that
the campaign to criminalize drunk driving was successful in large part
because Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) were able to change the
public's view of the drunk driver from a foolish individual who harms only
himself to one who harms others, including children (thus associating drunk
driving with the core crime of physical aggression).' 2 There is reason to
8.
PAUL H. ROBINSON & JoHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 226 (1995) (noting that for about 20% of the scenarios the
standard deviation exceeded 3.50).
9.
Robinson, supra note 1, at 1107.
10. Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 3, at 1880-91 (finding "considerably less
agreement" with respect to the ranking of crimes such as marijuana and cocaine use and dealing,
prostitution, underage drinking, abortion, and several other crimes).
11. Or more likely, certain types of women and men might prefer these options. See Dan
M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent. Who Perceives What, and Why, in AcquaintanceRape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 729, 729 (2010).
12. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implicationsfor Criminal
Law andJustice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 60 (2007).
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question this particular story, for reasons suggested below. But even if it is
an accurate portrayal of the dynamic that led to making drunk driving a
crime, the suggestion here is that, for many other controversial criminal law
topics, no general agreement is possible, in which case empirical desert is
not much help to policymakers. 3
II.

Do PEOPLE KNOW OR CARE WHEN THE LAW DIVERGES FROM THEIR
VIEWS ON DESERT?

Assume now that research can tell us fairly accurately when most people
in society agree on the proper ordinal rank of a large core of crimes and that
this view is desert-based. Assume further that societal differences on the
proper absolute punishment based on desert are either not significant or can
be taken into account through sentencing ranges that encompass the most
significant variances in punishment preferences-as occurs under "limiting
retributivism" provisions such as those recommended by the current version
of the Model Penal Code. 4 Finally, assume that, for various reasons,
policymakers do not adhere to the consensus views on desert in a
substantial number of instances, by either failing to punish adequately those
who deserve it or by punishing those who do not. Robinson suggests that
under these conditions the public will often become contemptuous, scornful
and disdainful toward the legal system and, in the latter situation
(punishment of undeserving individuals), perhaps also fearful of and angry
toward it.' There are reasons to doubt these assumptions as well.
Hypothesis 4: Most departuresfrom empirical desert will not be noticed
by the public. Robinson provides support for this hypothesis himself,
perhaps inadvertently, with his attempts to debunk general deterrence as an
efficient means of preventing crime. As he puts it, "what we know from
studies is that even criminals commonly have no idea what the [criminal
law's] rule is and, even if they think they know, they often have it wrong."' 6
Other research indicates that most people are surprised to learn the law of
their jurisdiction, and usually assume that it comports with their view of

13. See generally Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & David Hoffman, Some Realism About
PunishmentNaturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. _ (forthcoming) (arguing that disagreement about
what and how much to punish crimes outside the core is intense, and thus that work showing
high agreement about core crimes "lacks sufficient connection to live controversies" to have any
useful impact).
14. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 1109-10.
15. Robinson & Darley, supra note 12, at 22.
16. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1093.
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what the law should be. 7 If all of this is true, then the disrespect for the law
that Robinson hypothesizes will arise from public perceptions of its
divergence from their views cannot occur.
Hypothesis 5: Departuresfrom empirical desert that are noticed will
often not occasion negative reaction because they achieve other legitimate
goals. Of course, many members of the public are aware of at least some
criminal justice policies, especially after a well-publicized case occurs. But
the fact that a particular policy departs from empirical desert may not bother
them if it achieves other objectives they consider worthwhile. Consider, for
instance, three strikes laws which impose a very long sentence on offenders
who have committed a third felony, often even if the third felony is only a
minor one. To the extent that we have evidence from empirical desert
studies, these statutes are out of line with public views on desert. 8 And, as
Robinson has pointed out, three strikes laws also make little sense from a
deontological desert perspective because these laws are disproportionate not
only in relation to the most recent crime, but also in relation to the typical
recidivist's combined criminal history, even if one adopts a nose-thumbing
theory that repeated criminality warrants greater punishment.' 9 Yet three
strikes laws are very popular.2" Presumably that is because where recidivist
offenders are concerned the public is at least as worried about its own safety
as it is about desert.2 '
From an empirical desert perspective, should legislators nonetheless
repeal such laws? Robinson suggests that concerns about dangerousness
should be dealt with through post-sentence civil commitment statutes, so
that the criminal justice system can remain untainted by incapacitative
agendas. But these commitment statutes might not only fail to assuage the
community to the extent they fail to identify the dangerous (witness the

17. John M. Darley et al., The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 165, 181 (2001).
18. Norman J. Finkel et al., Recidivism, Proportionalism,and IndividualizedPunishment,
39 Am.BEHAV. SCI. 474, 481-82 (1996).
19. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453,
493 (1997) ("[N]either the first-offense discount nor the nose-thumbing penalty... support the
kinds of dramatic increases for apparent dangerousness that we see in current practice.").
20. See Franklin E. Ziniring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the Decline of
Expert Authority: Some Reflections on "Three Strikes" in California, 28 PAC. L.J. 243, 255
(1996) (describing Three Strikes as "an extreme, but by no means isolated, example of the kind
of law produced when very little mediates anti-offender sentiments").
21. Robinson has acknowledged as much. Robinson & Darley, supra note 12, at 42
("[D]eterrence and incapacitation ... have had the greatest influence in recent criminal justice
reforms.").
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furor over crimes committed by released insanity acquittees 22 ), they may
' 23
well be unconstitutional if applied to "ordinary recidivists.
Hypothesis 6: Conversely, when segments of the public do react
negatively to a criminal law or a case, the reaction will often be based on
something other than divergencefrom their views on desert, at least when
these views are defined as (a) reasonedconcerns about (b) ordinal desert in
connection with (c) core crimes. As illustrations of the subcomponents of
this hypothesis, consider three criminal law issues that routinely receive
significant media attention: juveniles who commit serious crimes; driving
while drunk; and drug-related crimes.
One possible desert-based reaction to the first type of case is that
application of the traditional rehabilitative juvenile justice approach to
violent adolescent offenders is insufficiently punitive; after all, one might
reason, killers should receive the same penalty whether they are adults or
adolescents. In fact, this type of reaction appears to have led to the
proliferation of statutes that either transfer juveniles as young as twelve to
adult court if they commit serious crimes or end juvenile court jurisdiction
entirely at age fifteen or sixteen.24 But these desert-based views may be
more visceral than reflective. For instance, in one of their initial studies,
Robinson and Darley report that a large percentage of survey participants
responding to laboratory scenarios rather than actual cases believe that
juveniles below eighteen should receive lesser penalties than adults, even
for serious crime.25 In other words, "calm" empirical desert might be quite
different from anecdote-driven "reactive" empirical desert.26 When that is
true, what is the counsel of empirical desert? Enact laws in response to heat22. See generally James W. Ellis, The Consequences of the Insanity Defense: Proposalsto
Reform Post-AcquittalCommitment Laws, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 961, 963 (1986) (recognizing
that public dissatisfaction with the insanity defense is fueled by the concern that too many
defendants are "getting off' or "going free").
23. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (limiting post-sentence
commitment to individuals who have a mental disorder "that makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for the person to control [their] dangerous behavior").
24. Richard E. Redding & Barbara Mrozoksi, Adjudicatory and DispositionalDecision
Making in Juvenile Justice, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT AND
INTERVENTION 232, 238 (Kirk Heilbrun et al. eds., 2005).
25. ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 8, at 141 (table showing average liability
assignments for murder by adult to be 10.42; by 18-year-old 8.70; by 14-year-old 6.66; and by
10-year-old 4.84).
26. See Adam J. Kolber, How to Improve EmpiricalDesert, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 433, 44142 (2009) (making this point, and noting that people who are angry tend to be more "punitive").
Along the same lines is research suggesting that people are more "hardline" in the abstract than
when they have responsibility for deciding about a criminal justice issue. Loretta J. Stalans &
Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and Change in Lay Evaluations of Criminal Sentencing:
Misperception andDiscontent, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 199, 206-07 (1990).
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of-the-moment desert determinations in order to avoid conflict? Or enact
laws that reflect calmer views on desert but that will lead to community ire?
The reaction to the second type of case has been the criminalization of
drunk driving. As recounted earlier, Robinson and Darley suggest that this
development was desert-based because of advocates' ability to analogize
drunk driving to core crimes. But perhaps the success of MADD was not
based on desert at all, but rather was an instantiation of "empirical risk"
rather than empirical desert. As Robinson states, MADD advocates holding
up pictures showing "the horrible results of car accidents caused by drunk
drivers[] provided a powerfully persuasive message that drunk driving was
indeed conduct highly dangerous to others."27 Had legislators not
criminalized drunk driving and public outrage ensued, would that outrage
have been based on a failure to give these drivers what they deserve, or
instead would it have stemmed from the perceived failure to protect the
public? The more general point, parallel to Hypothesis 1, is that if people
are bothered by a particular case or criminal law, their scorn toward the
system may often be based on something other than a failure to follow
ordinal desert. Failure to protect its citizens might be the most potent reason
government loses citizen trust.
The third type of case has resulted in a wide array of harsh laws for drug
sale and possession. 8 But it has also given rise to drug courts, which in
some jurisdictions divert persons charged with drug-related crimes,
including felonies, out of the criminal justice system entirely.2 9 The
problem here is that drug-related crimes are beyond the core of agreement
about desert. Thus, while a sizeable portion of the public apparently
supports harsh drug laws (perhaps because, like MADD, advocates for these
laws have been able to associate drug crimes with ruined families and
children), much of the public does not, for all sorts of reasons. Most
dramatically, as Robinson himself notes, in "some inner-city communities,
in which very high proportions of young African-American males have
done prison time for actions that the community does not regard as criminal,
it may be that being an 'ex-convict' no longer stigmatizes the individual in
that community." 3 When there is serious disagreement about desert

27.

Robinson & Darley, supra note 12, at 60 (emphasis added).

28.

See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of

CriminalLaw, 91 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 859 (2001) (noting that all of New York's
possession laws require a minimum of one year in prison and eleven provide for a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment).
29. See Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831, 832 (2000).

30.

Robinson & Darley, supranote 12, at 21.
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rankings, which could exist for any crime outside the core, legislators trying
to follow empirical desert are between a rock and a hard place.
III.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF KNOWLEDGE THAT THE LAW DIVERGES
FROM SOCIETAL VALUES?

Let us now assume that consensus views on desert have been reliably
ascertained, that the law routinely fails to adhere to these views, and that the
public notices and is bothered by the divergence. This narrow set of
circumstances, Robinson believes, is likely to occasion noticeably less
compliance with the law, even if the failure to adhere to empirical desert is
based on general deterrence, incapacitative or rehabilitative goals. Along
with Kurzban and Owen Jones, he argues that "[g]aining a reputation for
'getting it wrong'-for regularly and intentionally relying upon rules that
do injustice-can promote subversion and resistance to the system, can
undermine the effective, yet cheap normative influence of stigmatization,
can reduce people's willingness to defer to the law in cases of normative
ambiguity, and can subvert the criminal law's ability to shape community
norms and to induce people to internalize the norms expressed in the
criminal law."'" Thus, he quotes a commentator to the effect that "society is
weakened every time a law is passed that large numbers of reasonable,
responsible citizens think is stupid."32 In the following hypotheticals, the
word "stupid" is a stand-in for laws that bother the public because they do
not reflect consensus empirical desert.
Hypothesis 7: Stupid criminal laws will not have a significant impact on
compliance with the law. This hypothesis challenges the crux of Robinson's
argument. Robinson relies heavily on the work of Tom Tyler for the
proposition that, as Tyler put it in his seminal work, Why People Obey the
Law, "[t]he most important normative influence on compliance with the law
is the person's assessment that following the law accords with his or her
sense of right and wrong."33 While Tyler's work does suggest that people
are less likely to obey laws they think are wrong-headed (e.g., some types
of traffic laws and laws that criminalize possession of small amounts of
drugs), much of his research proves a different proposition: that people's
willingness to comply with the law in general is strongly affected by
31. Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D. Jones, Realism, Punishment & Reform,
77 U. CHI. L. REv. __ (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 4), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1590463.
32. Robinson & Darley, supra note 12, at 28 (quoting John Coffee).
33. ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64 (1990) (quoted in Robinson & Darley,
supra note 12, at 25).

1198

ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

whether people believe the law is "legitimate," which in turn is determined
in large part by whether they perceive that authorities are adhering to tenets
of "procedural justice." As Tyler more recently expressed his thesis, the
framework adopted in Why People Obey the Law "is not linked to either the
favorability or fairness of the decisions made or policies pursued by legal
authorities. Rather, legitimacy is linked to the justice of the procedures by
which the police and courts implement the law."34 Indeed, even in his
original work, Tyler stated that "[p]eople generally feel that law breaking is
morally wrong, and that they have a strong obligation to obey laws even if
they disagree with them."35
Thus, Tyler's views as to why people obey the law are more complex
than Robinson suggests. The extent to which the law reflects the public's
moral views is not unimportant, but equally if not more important is the
public's perception of whether the law has considered those views, is
transparent, and fairly adjudicates disputes when contested moral values are
at issue.36 Robinson's principal example of vigilante justice-where
townspeople killed a man after the authorities had allowed him to terrorize
them for years-appears to fall into the latter category.37
If the criminal law stopped holding murderers, rapists, and robbers
accountable, or the criminal adjudication system routinely let people who
committed such core crimes go, rebellion would undoubtedly be in the
offing. But unless a fundamental shift in criminal justice occurs, the
divergence between the law and lay views with respect to core crimeswhich, again, is the only arena where empirical desert laws makes sense-is
likely to be small, with the likely result that the contempt generated by such
a difference will also be small, and the likelihood of non-compliance even
smaller. For instance, in Robinson and Darley's original research,
participants disagreed with the positions taken by the Model Penal Code on
over half of the eighteen issues studied, all having to do with the mens rea

34. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 273 (2d ed. 2006).
35. TYLER, supra note 33, at 64.
36. See also Jaime L. Napier & Tom R. Tyler, Does Moral Conviction Really Override
Concerns about ProceduralJustice?A Reexamination of the Value Protection Model, 21 Soc.
JUST. RES. 509 (2008) (contesting the conclusions of Skitka et al. that procedural justice
concerns are trumped by "moral mandates" by re-analyzing Skitka et al.'s data and concluding
that "the justice of decision-making procedures is found to significantly influence people's
reactions to decisions by authorities and institutions even when their moral mandates are
threatened").
37. Robinson & Darley, supra note 12, at 21-22. Polls showing a loss of respect for the
legal system in the wake of the O.J. Simpson acquittal and the acquittals of the officers who
beat Rodney King also appear to be based on a sense of procedural injustice rather than
substantive injustice. Janice Nadler, Floutingthe Law, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1399, 1426 (2005).
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or grading of aggression and theft crimes (i.e., core crimes).38 A number of
jurisdictions have adopted many of these Model Penal Code provisions.3 9
Yet it is highly unlikely willingness to comply with the criminal law has
decreased in these jurisdictions, either because members of the public are
not aware of the divergence (Hypothesis 4), do not care about it (Hypothesis
5) or, consistent with the current hypothesis, are more prone to obey than
disobey the law even when they are disgruntled by it.
Providing a possible counter to this assertion is a very interesting study
carried out by Professor Janice Nadler. 4' Nadler exposed her subjects to the
facts of an actual case, in which a young man named Cash witnessed his
friend molest a child and soon thereafter learned the friend had also killed
the child, but did not report the incident to the authorities either at that time
or later (even though he could easily have done so), and bragged about the
incident to acquaintances. Under the law of complicity and omission
liability in the relevant jurisdiction, Cash was not criminally liable. But
Nadler's subjects thought he should have been. More relevant to Robinson's
thesis, those who were told the actual disposition of the case were
subsequently much more likely to act in a non-compliant fashion than those
who were (falsely) told Cash received a year in prison. Specifically, when
acting as mock jurors, those who were told that Cash was not prosecuted for
his failure to seek out the authorities were more likely than the second
group to refuse to apply a law, requiring life in prison for a third conviction,
to a homeless individual with two prior offenses who clearly stole a
shopping cart.4"
Of course, as Nadler notes, a willingness to nullify a draconian law in a
mock setting is not the same as a willingness to violate substantive criminal
prohibitions in real life.42 Furthermore, the chance to nullify the law
occurred immediately after learning of the "injustice" done in Cash's case.
Thus, to the extent anger over an unjust law occasions misconduct, it may
have to occur within a short time span. Nonetheless, Nadler's study does
tend to disprove this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 8: Stupid criminal laws that cause non-compliance will have
a relatively narrow impact. Most research that tries to tie non-compliance to
disagreement with the law indicates that the non-compliance is aimed at the
38. For a summary of the studies and the extent to which their results conflict with Model
Penal Code provisions, see Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to
Inform Substantive CriminalLaw, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315, 316-21 (1996).
39. See Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The
Challenge of the Special Part,2 BUFF. CRiM. L. REv. 297, 297-98 (1998).
40. Nadler, supra note 37, at 1410-26.
41. Id. at 1423-26.
42. Id. at 1438.
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triggering law-the specific law that goes against the moral grain-rather
than law writ large. Studies show that laws that criminalize popular
activity-underage drinking, marijuana use or gambling-have been
ignored by large segments of the populace who want to engage in those
behaviors, but do not show that these individuals become scofflaws more
generally.43 And if laws that mete out less punishment than empirical desert
requires cause people to be non-compliant, one might again reasonably
assume that the failure to abide by the law would be crime-specific, as well
as primarily the result of a failure of deterrence rather than a failure to abide
by empirical desert. For instance, if the criminal law suddenly relaxed
punishment of rapists or robbers contrary to the demands of empirical
desert, any increase in criminal activity that did occur would probably be
limited to those crimes and be attributable to a lessened fear of harsh
punishment than the product of disrespect for the law.
Again, Nadler's study suggests otherwise. As she puts it, her results
indicate that "specific instances of perceived injustice in the legal system
can lead to diminished deference to the law generally."' But given the
artificial nature of her study, much more empirical work needs to be done
on this score, ideally testing that proposition in the real world. Although
ethical constraints inhibit researcher attempts to produce non-compliance
with the criminal law, many situations-such as the adoption of an
empirically "unjust" MPC provision-provide opportunities for natural
experiments along these lines.
Hypothesis 9: The non-compliance resultingfrom stupid laws will not be
as great as the non-compliance resultingfrom laws that are not stupid, but
that fail to achieve other goals such as deterrence or incapacitation.In
other words, this hypothesis states, implementation of empirical desert will
not be as effective at preventing crime as more explicit efforts at achieving
utilitarian goals. This hypothesis again directly challenges the crux of
Robinson's argument. If the aim of empirical desert is controlling crime,
then a regime based solely on empirical desert must be superior to all
competing regimes in terms of that goal. Consider, for instance, a
sentencing system the sole objective of which is to prevent recidivism
within very broadly-defined retributive limits,45 or a system that focuses on
43.

See description of studies in ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 8, at 202-03; GEORGE
195 (2005) (arguing, based on empirical work, that while
people may ignore speed limits, legal drinking ages, and the prohibition against downloading
music without paying for it, they feel that it would be wrong to disobey "weightier" laws they
do not like, such as the requirement to pay annual income taxes).
44. Nadler, supra note 37, at 1439.
45. See Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth Option,
95 IOWA L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2009) (proposing such a regime for juvenile offenders).
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restorative justice.46 While these latter regimes might run afoul of empirical
desert, both might also be more effective at reducing crime. To date, no
empirical work has directly explored these propositions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

All of the hypotheses laid out above are, by design, hostile to the idea
that empirical desert should drive the definition of crimes and sentencing
rules. It may well be that many or all of these hypotheses will be disproven.
But they need to be tested more rigorously than they have been, a point with
which Professor Robinson surely agrees.
Many of these hypotheses also suggest that the tensions between desert
and other purposes of sentencing cannot be as easily eradicated as Robinson
suggests. However, a different form of empirical desert-focused on the
type of disposition, rather than its ranking or length-might be more
successful at doing so, as suggested by one last hypothesis. Hypothesis I0:
The dispositions dictated by other goals of criminaljustice satisfy empirical
desert in a large number of cases. As Robinson has noted, many types of
intermediate sanctions designed primarily to achieve rehabilitative goals
might have just as much "punitive bite" as prison, which is the normal
punishment for blameworthy conduct.47 For instance, a study conducted by
Harlow, Darley and Robinson, using a small sample in New Jersey, found
that participants equated three years of an intensive supervision program or
three years of weekend sentences with a year in prison in terms of
punishment units.4"
This latter type of research might help resolve the apparent conflict
between retributive and utilitarian punishment goals. For instance, one of
the more exciting developments in criminal risk management over the past
ten years is multi-systemic therapy, which appears to be able to reduce
drastically the recidivism of violent juveniles much more cheaply than
traditional dispositions, in part because it takes place entirely in the

46. See John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or
Utopian?,46 UCLA L. REv. 1727, 1743 (1999).
47. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
CriminalLaw Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 996 (2003).
48. Robert E. Harlow, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, The Severity of Intermediate
Penal Sanctions: A Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtaining Community Perceptions,
11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 71, 85 (1995). Also of possible relevance to this hypothesis
are studies showing that offenders "judge certain types of community-type punishments as more
severe than prison." Joan Petersilia, Alternative Sanctions, in MINIMIZING HARM: A NEW CRIME
POLICY FOR MODERN AMERICA 115, 142 (1999).
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community over a four to six-month period.4 9 If the public views intensive
and demanding in-house rehabilitative efforts over a half-year time span to
have sufficient punitive bite in the case of violent juvenile offenders, then
this type of intervention could achieve both specific deterrence and
empirical desert goals simultaneously. Of course, if instead the public
believes that multi-systemic therapy is not sufficiently punitive, even in the
juvenile context, reconciliation of empirical desert with individual
prevention goals will be more difficult, and will directly raise the issues
addressed in Hypotheses 7 and 9: Do rehabilitative dispositions for violent
acts occasion significant non-compliance among the general populace, and
if so, does the resulting increase in crime exceed the crime reduction
capabilities of multi-systemic therapy?
The bottom line: before empirical desert can be advanced as the lodestar
of criminal law doctrine, much more empirical work must be conducted.

49.

See ScoTr

W. HENGGELER ET AL., MULTISYSTEMIC TREATMENT OF ANTISOCIAL

BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 252-54 (1998).

